



Cultures of Governance  
and Conflict Resolution  
in Europe and India



This Project is funded by the European Union under the 7th Framework Programme

## D.7.6: International Conference India

Deliverable submitted December 2013 (M36) in fulfillment of requirements of the FP7 project, CORE - The role of Governance in the Resolution of Socioeconomic and Political Conflict in India and Europe (Theme SSH-2010-4.2-1: Cultures of governance and conflict resolution in Europe and India)

	CORE Coordinator: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)	PO Box 9229 Grønland NO-0134 Oslo, Norway	T: +47 22 54 77 00 F: +47 22 54 77 01	<a href="http://www.projectcore.eu">www.projectcore.eu</a>
---	--	--	--	--

## Introduction

December 2013 marks the end of a three year research project that saw researchers from India and Europe come together to jointly examine the interface between conflict and governance in India's north east, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Bihar and Europe's Georgia, Bosnia and Cyprus under the auspices of a EUFP7 project entitled "Cultures of Governance and Conflict Resolution in the EU and India."

A dissemination meeting was held over two days in New Delhi on 11-12 November 2013. (For detailed programme schedule see Annexure 1.) It brought together a select group from Delhi's academic practitioner and policy making circles to share the key findings from this project and discuss its future implications in terms of theory building, research, practice and policy. (For profiles of the non-project panelists see Annexure 2.) While empirical findings and voices from the field from the six case studies were flagged, the dissemination meeting structured the discussions around broad thematic rubrics that have cut across the case studies, such as the role of elections and electoral politics, autonomy, dialogue and reconciliation, resistance and protest and the role of civil society in conflict zones. It discussed the future implications of the project for theory, research, practice and policy and a special roundtable with policy makers was held at the end of the second day.

Invitees included academics, research scholars, conflict resolution practitioners from Delhi working broadly in the area of peace conflict and governance from universities and think tanks. The policy briefs generated from this project were used as the basis for discussion with a group of policy makers from Delhi including members of the Planning Commission, bureaucrats, elected representatives, and policy think tanks.

## Day 1: November 11, 2013

### Session 1: Introducing the Project:

The first session of the day introduced the research project and consortium to the audience consisting of academics, practitioners and policy makers in New Delhi.

In his welcome address Rajesh Tandon invited questions that take us forward in our understanding of as well as practices in conflict resolution. He reminded the audience that even as we sit in our sanitized conference room the heat and dust of conflict and politics was being played out in Maoist/Naxal affected Chhattisgarh in India as it went to the polls. These were the kinds of conflicts that the research project had engaged with and in India these continued to be dynamic sites of conflict.

Peter Burgess provided an overarching project overview. He alluded to the challenges of coordinating a three year research project of 2.4 million Euros across different cultures of science, interests and values. He pointed out that a number of streams of thoughts had over the years, come together to establish what is meant by peace and as a by-product it had also laid out what the term conflict could imply. The dominant discourse seemed to suggest that stable peaceful societies are governed by a set of liberal ideas. There have been massive problematizations of this. The post-colonial scholarship among other strands of scholarship has

challenged this formulation. Burgess also reminded the audience of the field studies which drew attention to the fact that how Europeans have “done peace” and how Indians have done it have been clearly different. While contrasting the more functional technocratic approach of Europe to the more grassroots oriented and civil society oriented approaches in India might be an oversimplified way of describing the reality, there is some truth to this. There have of course been myriad shades of complexities while unravelling the links between conflict and governance.

Roger MacGinty speaking on the linkages between the term governance and conflict resolution drew attention to the fact that the “competition” to invent terms like human security, stabilization et al, meant that governance and conflict resolution may get lost in this jumble/jungle of terminology. While the term conflict resolution appears timid and orthodox in comparison to the progressive term conflict transformation, at the end of the project it seems that at least in practice, resolution is what states are doing rather than transformation. According to MacGinty, governance is another overused term. How do we unpack it? Governance is something people construct - it is not just an agenda. We have looked at both top down and bottom up governance in the project. Explicating on the linkages between conflict and governance, he suggested that while conflict resolution can be regarded as a form of governance, governance does not always involve conflict resolution. Governance systems can do many things – it can escalate conflict, it can be conflict inducing at the same time, it can also de-escalate conflict and encourage pacific behaviour. Both involve power and dialogue but types of power can be hidden. Both are instrumentalized with institutions and commissions. Both call themselves peace but bottom up practices have shown how local partnership and agency can operate. He reminded us that the project has raised key issues of legitimacy, order and power.

## Session 2: Conflict and Governance: Findings from Indian Case Studies

The second session focused on the findings from the Indian conflict case studies and was chaired by B.G. Verghese from the Centre for Policy Research.

Ranabir Samaddar focusing primarily on the conflicts in the north east of India, home to long standing insurgencies, began his presentation by suggesting that governance cannot be done without attending to conflict. Despite the fact that the literature from the World Bank makes it look like governance is a seamless exercise while conflict is the disruptive exercise this neat formulation breaks down when we look at conflict regions like India’s north east for instance. The fact that the Indian state uses police methods, economic methods, governing methods to elicit consent in the north east is not exceptional. The relationship of governance and conflict has to be viewed in a historical perspective. Governance is more than administration and has never been free of geopolitics.

Navnita Chadha Behera who had worked on the Kashmir case study observed that their research indicated that the oft quoted healing touch policy of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) had maximum “recall value” among respondents interviewed as it connected to people in an emotional way. The research suggested a complex interplay of perceptions on who has suffered the most – whether it was the militants, ex militants, non-combatants and so on. A dwindling sympathy for militants was noted over the years. The overwhelming rejection of the political class in general of the earlier phase of the conflict was now giving way to a more nuanced condemnation where people were able to distinguish between state government, union government, political parties etc. Another strand of research had focused on autonomy

demands and the primary finding was that The Autonomous Hill Council initiative in Jammu and Kashmir had addressed the aspirations of the people in Ladakh. She also flagged the field research conducted by PRIA on trade across line of control and panchayat elections as complex governance initiatives that had unleashed a range of intended and unintended consequences.

Amit Prakash who had conducted the research on Jharkhand and Bihar pointed out that conflict is embedded in the political process- one cannot govern without conflict. Emancipation and change is not possible without conflict – the challenge is to study mechanisms where conflict does not spiral into violence. Governance is not something that governments do – it involves paying attention to myriad actors and institutions – it is not an outcome. Their research studied “Naxal affected’ districts (5 districts) in Jharkhand and Bihar by focusing on multiple actors - bureaucrats, police, Naxals, elected representatives. State is part of the conflict – it is an actor to suppress conflict as well as a participant in the conflict. The study was informed by the fact that conflict is continuous and has a history. He argued that Naxalism today is different from the Naxalism of the 1960s – the present Naxals appear less focused on ideology. The research also found that in Jharkhand panchayats have become a site for contestation. Conflict prevention has been done through the vehicle of development and this plays itself out at the panchayat level which then becomes an arena of competition for conflict actors including the Naxals. Ironically the new security apparatus is seen as the means to augment security even as it begs the question: do better guns lead to better policing? A moral hazard is created because to get money the administration needs to prove that conflict continues to thrive!

The chair Mr. B.G Verghese summing up the findings remarked that the psychology of fear had become pronounced in conflict areas. The social contract between the tribal people and the state enshrined in the special provisions of the constitution appears to have been torn asunder. He also reminded the audience that the promise of dignity of the individual is enshrined in the preamble to the constitution of India. Where the dignity of the individual is assaulted the spiral of conflict will be difficult to break.

### **Session 3: Conflict and Governance: Findings from the European Case Studies**

The third session focused on the findings from the European case studies and was chaired by Ummu Salma Bava, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Nona Mikhelidze speaking on the Georgia case study began by noting that the conflict in Georgia has to be seen in the context of the turmoil following the breakdown of former Soviet Union. Georgia’s conflict with Abkhazia which had sought independence from Georgia may have “ended” in 1993 with a ceasefire but it is the peace process that is frozen not the conflict. The EU has got involved with conflict resolution process in Georgia by activating elements in civil society but in her view The EU appears to be more interested in conflict management rather than resolution. Abkhazia has been deprived of international funding but EU continues to exercise some influence over state building processes there. Confidence building measure between the two parts was started because the border between the two parts was closed. EU has tried to provide assistance to democracy development in Georgia. EU tried to support civil society to create a pro EU environment in Georgia but the impact on conflict resolution has remained uncertain. The field research found that the exclusion of non-English speaking actors from the dialogue table has led to the exclusion of many new ideas. Another finding has been that the actual actors who lost the parliament elections in 2012 moved to the NGO sector and

the alacrity with which EU funded them seemed to suggest that EU has tried to strengthen its position *vis a vis* these political actors rather than genuinely strengthen civil society.

Roger MacGinty speaking on the Cyprus case study pointed out that Cyprus is the long divided island between Greece and Turkey – a division that has been formalized by the UN buffer zones. However freer movement is now possible between the two sides. Often internal politics and “ethnic entrepreneurs” between each side prevent broader level reconciliation because dialogue is seen as treacherous. Linked to this is electoral politics with elections on one side of the line creating further tensions. EU has placed great premium on north-south trade as a mechanism of conflict resolution. However the mutual suspicions persist, symbolized for instance on suspicions regarding the nature of what is being traded. This signals that economic incentives by themselves are not enough to promote conflict resolution and reconciliation. There is an illicit trade across the border- certainly not unique to Cyprus though. Communities adapt and find ways to survive. This trade is of course unregulated and uncontrolled. However it is also a creative avenue of possible transformation. A key focus of the fieldwork has been the role of civil society. EU has identified and promoted a large well established civil society which is comfortable with itself – it is not particularly creative. The occupied buffer zone movement consciously sees itself as an alternative to this civil society. One of the findings is that each generation inherits the conflict and gives it its own spin. What then are the research tools we can use to study this dynamic intergenerational conflict?

Elena Stavrevska speaking on the Bosnian conflict began by observing that Bosnia is a country of plurality at least by European standards. Conflict has been managed and avoided rather than resolved. In Bosnia all actors are multiple in some way or another. The international community has been present in the form of the office of high representative. The role of the EU has therefore increased. Ironically the international community appears to have more legitimacy than the locally elected representatives perhaps best captured by the fact that in the protest movement by civil society of June 2012 in front of the parliament the demands were addressed to the high representative and not the local politicians. The EU has also started waving the “financial carrot” recently realizing that the membership carrot is not enough. The CSOs in Bosnia like Georgia and Cyprus are donor driven and seen as foreign agents. She also pointed out that there is a “conflict replacement” process in place in the sense that conflict is being reconfigured around new lines such as class lines for instance. This perhaps has to do with basic issues of survival. Stavrevska drew attention to the fact that family and neighbourhood have been better sites of genuine conflict resolution and reconciliation even though (or perhaps because) they are ungoverned spaces.

Peter Burgess in his comments pointed out that part of the problem of conflict resolution is that EU as an actor is not always able to deal with heterogeneous entities- yet in all these conflicts heterogeneity is omnipresent. EU also has a more technical approach to these issues and on the whole seems better at governance rather than policing though in Georgia it has been doing the latter. On the whole he agreed with Mikhelidze that conflict resolution seems far less important for EU than conflict management.

Janel Galvanek raised the question of ensuring inclusive dialogue between the top down initiatives and those at the local levels. She also referred to the challenge of making an impact assessment of conflict resolution measures in all these cases.

The chair Ummu Salma Bava turned the searchlight on geopolitics and how the location of these three conflicts at the “rim” in Europe also conditions how EU responds to them as part of its overall neighbourhood policy. The liberal peace paradigm as interpreted by EU is offered to the three countries thereby often undercutting or undermining local preferences and values. She also pointed out that when civil society is co-opted as described in many of the case studies a new process of elite formation is set into motion. She wondered if the EU was in fact too ambitious in what it was trying to achieve in these three cases.

#### **Session 4: Thinking Beyond the Liberal Peace: A Dialogue:**

Session 4 was structured around the thematic rubrics of the forthcoming book coming out of the CORE project with each theme being discussed by two speakers at the end of which two discussants provided an overview of the large theoretical issues that emerged. It was moderated by Sumona DasGupta.

Ranabir Samaddar and Hans-Joachim Giessmann flagged off this session by presenting their views on peace as governance.

Ranabir Samaddar focused on the role of dialogue in governance harking back to Charles Tilly’s view of dialogue as contentious conversation. He pointed out that while democratic governance under the liberal paradigm does allow space for such contentious conversations the manner in and methodology through which these are articulated (on the streets or within parliament) would depend on the degree to which they are “tolerated.” Some prescribed forms of claim making (petitioning the parliament for instance) are “accepted.” If these do not have the necessary impact claim making could move into another dialogic scene (occupying the streets for instance) which could also be “tolerated” by liberal government. However when claim making moves into the realm of what the liberal government deems unacceptable their benign attitude to claim making also goes away and the coercive face of the state emerges. Yet contemporary world abounds with examples of non-institutional sites of claim making where “daily plebiscites” and issues of justice are raised and which continue to challenge the institutional sites. Herein lies the challenge of liberal governance. Those in governance no matter what their political affiliations may be would typically like dialogue to be regulated by certain laws or at least customary practices which prescribe the confined spaces within which dialogue can take place or can be tolerated. The question then remains, how can the demands articulated from below be accommodated within governance structures? Another important point to which Samaddar drew attention was that peace no matter what its form cannot be delinked from the globalization. The global flow of capital and the extractive role of capital cannot take place in war like conditions. Peace is the condition on which global accumulation of capital takes place. The challenge of liberal governance is then how to ensure those conditions where the reproduction of wealth and capital continue to take place.

Hans- Joachim Giessmann in his overview offered a range of perspectives through which the relationship of peace and governance could be conceptualized. Governance for peace could be seen through the lens of motivations for taking specific actions such as action on human rights; peace could be visualized as a particular mode of governance; a prerequisite for effective governance; a moral obligation based on universal values; and commitment to at least physical non-violence. No matter how we see this relationship clearly peace requires a certain type of governance. Governance in relation to peace could be understood as the means to an end (outcome) or as manifestation of peaceful “behaviour.” He also pointed out that while it was

comparatively easier to make the links between peace and governance at the micro level it was more difficult to do so at the meso and macro level. Giessmann also brought in the notion of peace as norms cautioning us however that while invocation of such norms could provide legitimacy to certain policies it was also a matter of contestation. Competitive norms could be seen as the first challenge of establishing peace through governance, the others being the role of emotions including hatred and revenge feelings in conflict situations, the pull and push factors that sometimes result in a resurgence of primordial loyalties and identity formation, and lack of awareness about and resources for doing this kind of work. There was also the challenge of local diversities and deciding how much of this would be fore fronted in governance for peace.

In the second set of presentations Roger MacGinty and Amit Prakash shared their views on the economics of peace. Roger MacGinty began by pointing out that EU sees itself as an exemplar of liberal economics and believes that if entities trade together there will be peace. EU and other factors have set in place an anti-war system. On one hand there is the belief that competition is a good thing – endorsing thereby the democratic peace theory. On the other hand there is an obsession with bureaucracy and rules. EU is deeply Keynesian in terms of giving away large sums of money even to small political units such as Northern Ireland. While there is a fundamental belief in the power of the market an important question is: where is the social compact between citizens, market and government? Do people have a say in maintaining this social contract? What is the role of welfare in our societies? India has mixed welfare with security and EU has also done the same thing. Both the Indian and EU examples show that growth is not enough – development is political- actors in the study have a long history of development in relation to peace and security. In India the sequence seems to be security first and then the welfare whereas in EU the idea is development contributes to peace. However both models have realised that development and security together have a role. If peacebuilding strategy is based on an economic strategy and the economic strategy is flawed the peacebuilding will also be doomed.

Amit Prakash opined that conflict is natural and exists in a continuum and the whole idea of policy options to “resolve conflicts” does not work in India or elsewhere for that matter. In India the state with all its administrative appendages remains a structurally capable actor and this sets the context in which the economics of peace plays itself out. The current administrative character and structure in the conflict areas such as Jharkhand and Bihar are such that no actor whether state or non-state has the ability to bring about change. However they all in a sense have the power of “strategic veto” or of obstructing change. The character of the conflict area is alluded to in reports but the conclusion is always that more money is needed to bring about change either in the security situation or for development. The state’s capacity to bring about change is limited but it does have the ability to set the parameters of engagement. Indeed the state defines all parameters – security as well as developmental – they evolve policy categories according to which all policies are made. All public resources are categorized in some way by the state and this defines who can access them. Prakash also argued that by anchoring all policies at the panchayat level and then defining all policy mechanisms panchayats become another instrument of control for the government rather than an arena where participatory development is played out. The power of veto of all actors and the power of control that the government has over instruments of local government (panchayat) thus become the twin pillars around which economic life is defined and in this scheme of things the policy categories which

the state sets become crucial. The combined impact is that all actors are “disciplined” into “behaving in a certain way.”

Navnita Chadha Behera and Elena Stavrevska made the next set of presentations on agency, autonomy and complicity in conflict zones based on the field research from Indian and European case studies.

Navnita Behera began by noting how in militarized situations different stakeholders converge, coalesce, and interact to create different faultlines at different conjunctures in the course of a long duration conflict. Patterns of conflict, cooperation, complicity change with the changing trajectories of the conflict as new allies and new partners emerge. A whole range of relationships between the state and non-state actors emerge and new sites of conflict appear even as some sites become less relevant. In the overwhelming victimhood discourse on the narratives of such complex conflicts a question that was asked was: are groups and associations able to exercise agency at all and if so how have these changed over time? Behera offered a plethora of examples of how agency is exercised in the midst of militarization of state and society in Jammu and Kashmir based on field research conducted by Delhi University and Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA). Field research conducted by Delhi University indicated that agency of militants in Jammu and Kashmir has for instance undergone a complete change – from being heralded as heroes and holders of social power they are now socially ostracized. The Autonomous Hill Council of Ladakh offers an example where people took it upon themselves to get their voices heard amidst the din of the overall conflict in Jammu and Kashmir and get their demands accepted. The Association of Parents of Disappeared persons (APDP) offers an example of how constitutional means have been used to keep the cause of the disappeared alive in the political narrative; The cross line of control trade in Jammu and Kashmir presents an opportunity to study how traders, members chambers of commerce can continue to pressure the government to address the economics of the cross LoC trade; the All Jammu and Kashmir Panchayat conference affords another site where elected representatives from across the sub regional divides have come together to push the governments to live up to their promises for devolution of powers. The example of the Hanjis and the Shikara and house boat owners association of Kashmir is an example of how a community has been caught between the needs for peace to promote their trade where they need the cooperation of the bureaucrats and the political establishment and the dangers of being seen as treacherous if they do not support the calls for strikes and bandhs by separatists. Behera also alluded to the power of the social media in mobilizing support among the youth. Local protests including the ones by stone pelters in the Kashmir valley which came into prominence in the summer of 2010, appears to be centred around local issues rather than on mega narratives of the conflict though the latter has certainly not disappeared from the political canvas.

Elena Stavrevska drawing on illustrations from Bosnia and Cyprus framed the question of compliance and resistance in terms of compliance and resistance to who or what. In the case of Bosnia for instance spatialization of ethnicity is the ordering principle of life that also permeates into people’s daily practices. Creation of ethnic spaces can be seen in schools, bars, the choice of newspapers and even telephone operators despite the fact that unlike Cyprus there is no physical border. Resistance therefore can be conceptualized as opposing these ethnic spaces through different ways - children of mixed marriages for instance sometimes choose to declare their identity in imaginative ways rather than allowing themselves to be boxed into the predetermined categories. Compliance on the other hand would imply staying within these ethnic spaces. She also referred to the Occupy Buffer Zone Movement in Cyprus which has

positioned itself as resistance to the bi-zonal approach to the Cyprus conflict – tellingly, it had found no allies in the international community. The resistance to the greenline regulations in Cyprus was based on the fears that trade would provide unfair advantage to one side but it was important to note it was not based on opposition to the division of Cyprus per se. Raising the issue of “intention” Stavrevska opined that looking at the question of what resistance to power could imply in negotiating daily lives could help uncover ways in which people cope with a divisive system which they cannot change structurally.

The final set of presentations by Peter Burgess and Atig Ghosh examined the relationship of between state and social justice issues.

Peter Burgess prefaced his remarks by noting that both Europe and India brought their respective worldviews to bear on how justice and social justice in particular is understood. While EU positioned itself as a “project of peace” built on the functional liberal economic model with human rights and rule of law as cornerstones the Indian model of justice was conditioned by its tradition of non-violence, the relationship between development and social justice and its ideology of accommodating diversity which was very different from the European notion of multi-culturalism. This variation on the understanding of social justice manifests itself in many different ways. To begin with the notion of solidarity, the idea of the individual and individual integrity is differently configured in Europe and India. On another note, the idea of social justice is explicitly enshrined in the Indian constitution but its operationalization is weak whereas in Europe the idea lies between the lines but is strongly operationalized. There is also the difference in the discourse around diversity – in India it coalesces around the notion of accommodation while in Europe it does so around the idea of recognition. There are differences in legal and ethical implications that follow from this. The relationship between social justice and liberalism is also another point of debate. Another question centres on the extent to which the limits of liberal peace map to social justice given that social justice is necessarily socially embedded. And finally there is the important question: in what setting is social justice most meaningfully manifested? Does peace follow justice or vice versa and where in all of this does transitional justice (provisional justice in the post conflict period) and generational justice fit in? The troubling question then emerges which he articulated as follows: is it necessary to slow track social justice in order to achieve liberal peace?

Atig Ghosh offering his overview on state and social justice issues from the vantage point of the Indian case studies observed that while democracy depends on constitutional unity and mass uniformity the politics of justice is much more contentious and creates fissures in the idea of the primacy of groups. Yet as post-colonial theory has shown that it is the yearning for social justice that is the driver of change and dynamism. The notions of freedom, equality, care and protection are all weighed ultimately on the scale of justice yet conventional political theory seems unable to theorize this. Clearly studying the liberal institutions is not enough – historical and ethnographic studies are necessary to understand popular notions of justice and the “marginal claims” that produce the idea of justice. Ghosh suggested that the idea of the justice is present in the Indian constitution but as an adjunct notion rather than a central notion that permeates constitutional thinking. And hence the “justice gap” emerges – the gap between the claims for justice and the governmental mechanisms to address them. The gap between justice and law remains largely unbridged.

Following the presentations two discussants, Anuradha Chenoy of Jawaharlal Nehru University and Tasneem Meenai of Jamia Millia Islamia offered their broad comments on the issues emanating from the presentations.

Anuradha Chenoy pointed out that what emerged from this research endeavour was the multi-layered nature of the conflicts and the manner in which conflicts keep changing even as they are being studied making for a constant dynamic field. The state and non-state actors change, new elites emerge and the ground keeps shifting. Second the terms that the researchers have used in this project are all contested - development, security, social justice, are all contested terms. What constitutes development in India continues to be part of an ongoing debate between two leading economists- Amartya Sen and Jagdish Bhagwati; security for whom continues to be the key question between those looking at national security paradigm and those studying human security. In the understanding of social justice with its emphasis on community rights the idea of transitional justice for individuals in conflict areas sometimes gets lost. She also reminded the audience that the idea of strategic veto creates a political economy where the market is safeguarded even in a state of apparent anarchy. Commenting on the presentation of resistance and autonomy she noted that while it was important to emphasize agency that could be used to rectify a certain wrong or injustice the question of long term rectification of the systemic injustice continues to hang in the balance. Finally Chenoy also pointed to the Indian state's policy towards conflict resolution and the implications of this for state structures, new autonomy demands, governments and people.

Tasneem Meenai in her overview of this session drew attention to the fact that governance is seen as a method of peacebuilding in the conflict studies. However this is applicable primarily where political institutions are weak in a post conflict situation. In India however despite the existence of many internal conflicts the state institutions are already established and in that sense governance as a tool of peacebuilding in the textbook sense does not apply. In the case of Europe an advanced experiment with integration is under way and it is assumed that the methods for dealing with conflicts non-violently are in place. This kind of regionalization of peace is however absent in South Asia as SAARC is still far from emerging as a conflict resolution mechanism.

In the discussion time several comments were raised from the floor. Priyanka Upadhaya emphasized that in his opinion the research undertaken needed to bring in more reflections on the Indian resources for peacebuilding including the traditions of inter religious dialogue, the theory and practice of non-violence and holistic notions of peace based on borderless world exemplified in Gandhian thought.

Picking up on the ideas of acceptable and non-acceptable forms of claim making that has been presented in this session scholar and writer Deepti Priya Mehrotra wondered how we can classify and theorize the protest of someone like Irom Sharmila of Manipur who has been fasting for 13 years to protest against the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. The fact that the state "allowed" her to protest in one sense according to her has to be read side by side with the fact that it had also kept her in solitary confinement which amounted to torture. This raised the larger question of what can be done if the laws of the state were unjust.

Activist and journalist Ashima Kaul speaking of her work with young people in Jammu and Kashmir described the experiments they had conducted with college students on issues of identity, memory history and residential workshops where the emphasis was on building

interpersonal relationships across divides. The challenge was however to scale up these micro level dialogue and reconciliation initiatives to meso and macro levels and impact policy and link with governance.

## **Day 2: November 12, 2013**

While the deliberations of the first day synthesised comparative lessons, the second day was designed to look to the future - drawing implications of the research for theory building, future research, and for practice - for both the India and European contexts. The penultimate session of the day was dedicated to tease out implications for policy with special reference to India.

### **Session 5: Implications for Research, Theory and Practice**

Session 5 examined the broader implications of this three year research project on future theory building, research and practice and was chaired by Neera Chandhoke.

Roger MacGinty speaking on the implications of the project for theory and theory building pointed out that given the importance of case studies in the project we needed something to tie these together, and in many ways that was the “theory” that the project generated. We needed an agile theoretical vehicle that helped tease out the connections and disconnections between the various cases. Theory also helped to link the field work with the big questions.

One constant that this project has grappled with has been liberalism, i.e., modes of thinking that draw on enlightenment and post-enlightenment eras, ideas of relationships between the market, individual and the state particularly in terms of rights. As researchers we are both prisoners of liberalism and enabled by it. Western liberalism has shaped our pedagogy, our literature, our concepts. And even though it may be in its orthodox form a European set of ideas, it has inflected theories and concepts that are in use in the Indian context too. This allowed us to hold shared conversations. The danger is that since liberalism is all-pervasive and considers itself superior, believing that somehow other ways of thinking are inferior, it closes our minds to alternatives. This raises the fundamental question: would we have the skills and tools to recognise alternative ways of thinking as being legitimate and valuable?

One of the theoretical challenges has centred around central actors and units of analysis. While India is a state actor engaged in state building process, EU is a supra national entity involved in institution building processes. We have also thought of ideas around stabilisation and pacification, and the claims that those ideas have made to peace. Both stabilisation and pacification have tried to pass themselves off as “peace” and this project has been useful in unveiling that facade, in showing that stabilisation and pacification might have a rhetorical interest in peace, but they are not peace. We have been able to see how peace has been instrumentalised in ways that remove it from the ambit of peace.

Another issue that the project has not been able to escape has been the post-colonial heritage in both Europe and India. All of the cases we looked at were post colonial yet post colonial theory has not necessarily been useful in all the cases. That tells us something about the biases of post colonial theory.

Repeatedly in this project we have kept coming back to two issues: power and agency. We have gone far beyond the top-down, state-centric view of power and institutions, and have looked at the informal, the local, the bottom-up, the marginal, the unseen. This is keeping with a lot of the critical literature on peace and conflict studies. While the project has not been overly respectful of existing theory it has opened new spaces for theory by acknowledging that theory is intrinsically linked with real people, living real lives.

Ranabir Samaddar speaking on the implications of the project for research pointed to the importance of foregrounding the issue of “new subjectivities” arising from a fundamental question, namely is the subject of conflict and the subject of peace the same? We are already assuming that the conflict in its most acute form is over and that governance is critical in bringing back peace/lessening acuteness of the conflict. If we move away from this assumption then what is the new subjectivity that we find in the conflict ridden areas? With the expansion of markets in these areas, there is emergence of crony capitalism, expansion of “government” and of money-centric relations, break-down/remoulding of old clan/traditional ties. We are seeing a post colonial version of the neo-liberal self emerging – the self that is conscious of market, of global linkages, that knows that money matters, that is aware that there are new ways to forge one’s relations with the society, a society that is not necessarily linked to one’s clan or tribe, etc. Are there new groups forming new identities in society, e.g., women in the north-east?

To the extent that peace is returning to these areas, in whichever way peace is defined, clearly it has a relation to capital accumulation signified by opening of banks, a new airport or much more direct actions (mines, extraction industries, water harnessing for power as in Arunachal Pradesh). The research question here would be: in these areas where we see peace returning and unstructured economies emerging, to what extent are they part of the overall greed of accumulation? These are termed as “shadow economies”, but what are they a shadow of?

Samaddar pointed to some critical questions raised by the project : can we compare cases of peace/conflict between India and Europe and within India? Do historical parallels hold ground? We have perhaps not drawn as much from historical parallels as we could have.

Highlighting another important point he argued that after 9/11, in the field of governance, to the extent it relates to conflict resolution, terror has become an important factor. It has securitised the entire question of governance in unforeseen ways which neither post colonial studies or old liberal methods could foresee. The impact of securitisation on the way in which governance functions has been inadequately researched. On one hand we argue that governance is basically a civilian method of ruling society and not a military method. In that case what securitisation does is that it allows governance to adopt a war-like mode without actually resorting to war. Foucault’s adage that governance and logistics have their source in the origins of war becomes pertinent here. Foucault has argued it is the model of war that has given us the model of governance. One of the persistent efforts of liberalism has been to sever the umbilical cords of governance from the military model. To the extent it has been successful, we believe we have arrived at a stage where we are in a civilian mode. But in some sense we have come back to the early eighteenth and nineteenth century stage where the link between the civilian mode of governing and the war mode of governing have come together and they are taking from each other as much as they can for their own benefit.

If this is the case, then an important task of future research would be, the role that is played by logistics. Circulation of finance, planning of society have enormous logistical planning and management. How do you plan? Who plans? On what basis do you plan? That logistic process assumes importance.

Hans-Joachim Geissmann outlining the implications of the project for the community of practitioners pointed to the need for greater dialogue between those conducting the analysis and those responsible for implementing recommendations for practice. Researchers need skills to communicate politically relevant messages from lessons learnt. Dialogic encounters imply recognition of the legitimacy of conceptual differences. According to Geissmann governance aimed at mitigating consequences of conflict must build relations between stakeholders. The task of conflict transformation in the long term is more important than resolving the conflict. There must be a sense of empathy for conflict transformation to take off. Initiatives will be successful on the ground only if actors feel a sense of ownership. Building constructive relations is an iterative process of reflective learning cycle. He also alluded to the role of the local in nurturing the potential for conflict transformation emphasizing that participation and ownership of a process is important. Geissmann spoke of resistance which instead of always being viewed as “spoiling” conflict resolution can be seen more constructively as a sounding board to evaluate the appropriateness of the initiatives. Resistance means that more communication and transparency were needed. He concluded that governance and governmentality cannot be controlled and planned. A sense of uncertainty when implementing initiatives is inevitable.

In the discussion that followed the presentation, Sumona DasGupta pointed out that while the EU liberal model looks at resolution and stabilization as the most important outcomes in India there appears to be a greater acceptance of the inevitability of the “messiness” of politics that results from having to work with diverse interests and actors. The challenge seems to be to find rules of engagement that enables us to wage conflict in a way that is not dysfunctional and violent rather than be intent on resolving conflicts for all times to come. Without conflict there cannot be a radical transformative agenda though a situation of dysfunctional violence is certainly not the way.

Independent scholar and journalist from Delhi Alpana Kishore raised the question of how to bring political messages in a state of negative peace – how do we deal with those who do not want dialogue and those who have an interest in keeping the conflict going? Political activist Salman Soz from Jammu and Kashmir carrying this point further specifically asked what one can do with those politicians, bureaucrats, military and police personnel who have over the years acquired a vested interest in the conflict.

The chair, Neera Chandoke raised some fundamental questions on the nature of peace and whether contained violence is tantamount to peace. Indeed is peace a condition natural to mankind in the first place? Political philosophers like Thomas Hobbes for instance clearly believed that it was not. In a collectivity where there are scarce resources and imperfect altruism how do we create a society in which there is even a temporary containment of violence unless justice is provided to a group that thinks it has been treated unjustly? The crucial issue according to Chandoke is therefore justice and not peace.

Pointing out that violence is a mode of politics Chandoke posited that it is important to distinguish between different forms of violence- violence which is linked to demands from the

state and which in turn reaffirms the status of the state as an institution; violence which renounces political obligation to the state and also does not feel a moral obligation to the rest of the citizens in the country- the violence in Jammu and Kashmir could be a case in point. A third form of violence like Maoist violence which we see in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh renounces political obligation to the state but does not renounce moral obligation to the rest of the citizens – they aim at building a better society. Three critical questions emerge from this understanding of violence. Is violence justified if people live in a society marked by three-fold disadvantage – social discrimination, economic marginalisation, lack of political voice? Can we move beyond accepted orthodoxies and start asking the question: is political violence justified? Violence is not a right like right to protest is a right. But it is possibly a right when people are subjected to multiple deprivations. However a related question is whether violence is a politically pragmatic way of getting demands met in a democratic country.

In the round of discussion that followed Roger MacGinty remarked that the comfort Indian researchers draw from the messiness of social and political life says something deeper about our epistemologies and about how Western thinking has been based on a conceit of how we can put “order” into situations where there is considerable disorder. But to what extent can this messiness actually be captured? Do we feel enabled by the tools that we have (policy tools, conflict analysis tools, theoretical tools) to capture this? The concept of messiness is valuable in understanding how politics works.

Salman Soz, political activist from Jammu and Kashmir pointed out that vested interests will always come in the way of justice. How do you deliver justice in a messy situation where a lot of injustice has happened at the hand of multiple players, like in Kashmir?

Amit Prakash pointed out that violence has a demonstration value in a case like Jharkhand. Actors who have a degree of control over violent mechanisms to derail the processes of politics, and who do not necessarily have a normative objective or goal, are a significant thread in many conflicts. Is liberal theory then becoming inadequate in being able to explain what is happening in society?

The discussions at this session also raised the question of the relationship between the world of academe and practice. Rajesh Tandon highlighted the disconnect between the different spheres of governance as governance is not a monolithic concept. Increasingly, these spheres have different political regimes, and therefore political mandates, and they operate somewhat differently. This dynamic (between local, subnational/provincial, national levels) is significant not only in the way conflict is understood but also how it is responded to. Going forward, this intersection between spheres of governance may well be an interesting research question.

The disconnect between the world of practice and world of academe is not limited to peace studies or conflict and governance; it is a much larger phenomenon which we must overcome. There are questions to be addressed on both sides of the relationship. A way forward is that the intersection between the world of knowledge and the world of practice is thought of as continuity of dialogue rather than in episodic ways.

Atig Ghosh raising a counterpoint to this general sense of disconnect between academia and practitioners pointed out that in North-east India there is more gainful interaction of the two. One hardly finds a “unique” academic or activist in this region; in the same person one finds

multiple identities (academics are also journalists, activists are writers, etc) and they themselves do not make the distinction. This makes interaction easier. Also, in the North-east although the various ethnic groups have their own languages, English is a widely spoken language making communication easier among academics and practitioners.

### **Session 6: Implications for Policy**

In this session five researchers presented policy implications arising out of the findings from the case studies. The session was chaired by Partha Ghosh.

Amit Prakash speaking on the policy implications from the Jharkhand study noted that the state has changed its stance on “naxal violence” because till the early 2000s the state did not recognise it as the problem of a complex process in which violence is exercised as currency for power, dominance and resource control. Typically the state’s first response is to spend a huge amount of money on modernising and building up the capabilities of state police forces to ostensibly strengthen the “security architecture”. While the state has acknowledged a development deficit and institutional gap it has not necessarily comprehended the nature of the link between this and Naxalism. A lot of “hand-joining” has happened between the criminals, mafia and naxals to create a situation in which Naxals have the ability to exercise violence selectively for its demonstration effect. This funds the “levy economy” which has created a collaborative arrangement between bureaucracy, Naxals and local leadership where accountability of project implementation vanishes.

According to him the state has still to start grappling with panchayati raj institutions and its local embeddedness. Panchayati raj (local level) elections are seen as a sufficient step yet panchayats, which are supposed to be local level decision making bodies, are subject to bureaucratic gate keeping (rules, procedures, absence of funds and “categories of beneficiaries”). The possibility of transformation to address conflict on the ground is remote under the circumstances.

Prakash also highlighted that conflict in Jharkhand and Bihar is embedded in the social context of tribal and caste based associations. This impedes and influences all actors; everything is filtered through these institutions of caste and tribe to the extent that so-called “class based” naxal organisations are increasingly organised on caste lines. The policy implications of this is that conflict cannot be addressed by the state responses of security measures and straightjacketed programmes to bring development. Effectively panchayats do not function as institutions of local self governance.

Elena Stavrevska speaking specifically on the policy implications of residence registration in Bosnia emphasized that fictional residence registration in Bosnia can be seen as a form of resistance. It is related to political representation in the country. A lot of people in Bosnia register in a different entity from the entity in which they actually live in in order to secure better social benefits (pensions, health benefits, etc) and/or to enable their children to receive education in the mother tongue and in the religion which they practice. Bosnia has two entities with two different legal systems, three educational systems in three languages, and different social benefits in each system. This is particularly a problem for returnees, internally displaced people and for people living near the inter-entity boundary line. By registering in a different entity for social benefits, these people have no political representation in the entity in which

they actually live. This skews ethnic composition and the political picture. The other problem relates to budgets and taxes as they pay taxes in the entities where they do not live, but exhaust services in the budget of the entity where they are actually residing. This also reinforces the ethnic division. This problem is compounded by the lack of census in Bosnia for several years. Several technical solutions could make things a little better.

Sumona DasGupta spoke on the policy implications of village council (halqa panchayat) elections in Jammu and Kashmir in 2011, which had been seen as a major governance initiative in a area of conflict. She noted the difference in the understanding of the significance of these elections and their roles in ushering in peace in Kashmir. Because of these differences in understanding there are different expectations, which have not been managed effectively. There exists a tremendous dialogue gap between the different constituencies that has also resulted in a trust gap. A fantastic initiative has resulted in profound frustrations. Jammu and Kashmir has a legacy of violent conflict. That carries with it the legacy of broken trust and thwarted promises. Any squandering of opportunities will exacerbate old wounds.

To increase dialogic space between the different stakeholders, policy makers and the government needs to: (a) hold elections to all three tiers, (b) come up with a well thought out plan to address the predictable conflict between pre-existing administrative machinery and newly elected institutions of local governance, including financial modalities, (c) better training of panchayat elected representatives to build capacities at all levels, (d) keep open doors of dialogue between the people and the government, and between different levels of governance institutions, (e) clarity in roles and responsibilities, (f) constitute the state election commission and state finance commission, and (g) restore confidence through dialogue, highlight the importance of the halqa majlis (gram sabha). Village level participation in planning is essential if participation is to be sustainable. Poor progress in implementation of community plans leads to participation fatigue in the planning process.

Nona Mekhelidze spoke on the new government initiative (opening of the Russian-Georgian rail link) through Abkhazia aiming to increase mutual trust between the conflicted parties. The initiative has to be understood in the context of the broader geo-political context in which it is embedded. It is an example of how confidence building measures can be blocked by political and geo-political complications. As her policy brief suggests opening the Abkhaz railway would assist in the development of the economies of Georgia and Abkhazia and lead to an improvement in Georgian-Russian relations as well. Further it would confidence building between Georgia and Abkhazia. The lingering doubts in the rail project emanate from the suspicion that Russia might use this rail link to supply its military base in Armenia. Given these geopolitical considerations Mikhelidze argued that the Georgian government should move away from a narrow construction of nationalist position and take into account the benefits that such a rail link might have for the entire neighbourhood.

Priyankar Upadhyaya speaking on the policy implications from Meghalaya noted that there are three layers of conflict in Meghalaya: ethno-centric politics (superiority of Khasis and Garos over "outsiders", which is the most salient feature of everyday politics), tension between Khasis and Garos (Khasis want increased quota; this conflict is currently still invisible, but it is simmering), and the Garo insurgency (linked to unemployed and unemployable youth). Government attempts to provide some solutions to the relatively deprived always results in some backlash. There is no easy solutions to the problems. Engaging people and community policing, citizen

participation and raising awareness, inter-cultural understanding (everyday practices of different religions together), and connecting with rest of India (not merely through infrastructure and roads) are some of the ways forward.

The chair Partho Ghosh pointing to the connect between research work with relevance and policy relevant work posited that there is a huge body of literature created by research which may not immediately translate into policy. Over the years, the issues filter out for bureaucrats to pick up. The findings of this research are relevant for all of South Asia because it indicates that democracy has possibilities and limits- it is not an unmixed blessing.

A crucial issue raised by this body of research seems to be which comes first - resolution (so-called peace) or development? This debate has become popular ever since the issue of Khalistan militancy in Punjab was seen to have been “resolved” by police action. If Punjab is the test case, then resolving conflict comes before prosperity. This perhaps is a controversial statement particularly because there were accusations of human rights violations in the resolution of the Khalistan militancy.

Raising the link between ethnicurty and conflict he pointed to the contextual difference between India’s north east where considerations of ethnicities would make a project like the Georgia-Russia rail link much more complicated. He opined that the state needs to be visible and seen as functioning for conflicts to be resolved.

Concluding the discussion Rajesh Tandon pointed out that some of these issues - state capacities, state effectiveness, state sensitivity - may well be the research questions for future joint collaborative work.

## Annexure 1: Programme Schedule

### Day 1: November 11, 2013

---

SESSION 1	<i>Introducing the Project</i>	Welcome and opening remarks by Rajesh Tandon
9.00 am – 9.30 am	<b>Chair:</b> Rajesh Tandon (PRIA)	<b>Speakers:</b>  Peter Burgess (Peace Research Institute Oslo) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Project Overview</i></li></ul> Roger MacGinty (University of Manchester) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Governance and Conflict Resolution: Linking the Two</i></li></ul>
SESSION 2	<i>Conflict and Governance : Findings from Indian Case Studies – India’s North East, Jammu And Kashmir, Bihar and Jharkhand</i>	<b>Speakers:</b>
9.30 am – 11.00 am	<b>Chair:</b> B.G. Verghese (Centre for Policy Research)	Ranabir Samaddar (Calcutta Research Group) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>India’s North East: Voices and Views</i></li></ul> Navnita Chadha Behera (University of Delhi) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Jammu and Kashmir: Voices and Views</i></li></ul> Amit Prakash (Jawaharlal Nehru University) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Bihar and Jharkhand: Voices and Views</i></li></ul>
<b>TEA BREAK</b>		
11.00 am – 11.15 am		
SESSION 3	<i>Conflict and Governance: Findings from European Case Studies – Georgia, Cyprus, BiH</i>	<b>Speakers:</b>
11.15 am – 12.45 pm	<b>Chair:</b> Ummu Salma Bava (Jawaharlal Nehru University)	Nona Mikhelidze (Institute for International Affairs) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>The Conflict in Georgia: Voices and Views</i></li></ul> Roger MacGinty (University of Manchester) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>The Conflict in Cyprus: Voices and Views</i></li></ul> Elena Stavrevska (Central European University) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>The Conflict in BiH: Voices and Views</i></li></ul> <b>Comments:</b> Peter Burgess (Peace Research Institute Oslo)  Janel B. Galvanek (Berghof Foundation)
<b>LUNCH</b>		
12.45 pm – 1.45 pm		
SESSION 4	<i>Thinking Beyond the Liberal Peace: A Dialogue</i>	<b>Speakers:</b>
1.45 pm – 4.45 pm (with a tea break in-between)	<b>Moderator:</b>	Ranabir Samaddar (Calcutta Research Group) and Hans-Joachim Giessmann (Berghof Foundation)

---

---

Sumona DasGupta (PRIA)

- *Peace as Governance*

Roger MacGinty (University of Manchester) and  
Amit Prakash (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

- *The Economics of Peace*

Navnita Chadha Behera (University of Delhi) and  
Elena Stavrevska (Central European University)

- *Agency, Complicity, Autonomy in Conflict Zones*

Peter Burgess (Peace Research Institute Oslo) and  
Atig Ghosh (Calcutta Research Group)

- *State and Social Justice Issues*

**Comments:**

Anuradha M. Chenoy (Jawaharlal Nehru  
University)

Tasneem Meenai (Jamia Milia Islamia)

---

## Day 2: November 12, 2013

---

**SESSION 5**

**9.15 am – 11.15 am**

***Roundtable on Conflict and  
Governance : Implications for  
Research, Theory and Practice***

**Chair:**

Neera Chandhoke (Indian Council  
for Social Science Research)

**Speakers:**

Roger MacGinty (University of Manchester)

- *The CORE Project and Implications for  
Theory Building*

Ranabir Samaddar (Calcutta Research Group)

- *The CORE Project and New Research  
Questions*

Hans-Joachim Giessmann (Berghof Foundation)

- *The CORE Project and Its Implication for  
Conflict Resolution Practitioners*
- 

**TEA**

**11.15 am – 11.30 am**

**SESSION 6**

**11.30 am – 1.30 pm**

***Roundtable on Culture of  
Governance and Conflict  
Resolution in India and Europe:  
Implications for Policy***

**Chairs:**

Partha S. Ghosh, Senior Fellow,  
Nehru Memorial Museum and  
Library)

Rajesh Tandon (PRIA)

**Presentations on Policy Briefs:**

Amit Prakash (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

- *Conflict, Governance and Development: Lessons  
from Bihar and Jharkhand*

Elena Stavrevska (Central European University)

- *Ensuring Political Representation in Bosnia-  
Herzegovina*

Sumona DasGupta (PRIA)

- *Panchayat Elections in Jammu and Kashmir: A  
Lost Opportunity for Conflict Sensitive  
Governance*

Nona Mekhelidze (Institute for International Affairs)

- *Opening the Russian-Georgian Railway Link  
through Abkhazia*
-

---

Priyanka Upadhyaya (Malviya Centre for Peace Research, BHU)

- *Interrogating Peace in Meghalaya*

**Lead Discussant:**

Partha S. Ghosh (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library)

**Responses and comments from policy-makers**

**Vote of thanks**

---

**LUNCH**

**1.30 pm – 2.30 pm**

---

**SESSION 5**

**9.15 am – 11.15 am**

***Roundtable on Conflict and Governance : Implications for Research, Theory and Practice***

**Chair:**

Neera Chandhoke (Indian Council for Social Science Research)

**Speakers:**

Roger MacGinty (University of Manchester)

- *The CORE Project and Implications for Theory Building*

Ranabir Samaddar (Calcutta Research Group)

- *The CORE Project and New Research Questions*

Hans-Joachim Giessmann (Berghof Institute)

- *The CORE Project and Its Implication for Conflict Resolution Practitioners*
- 

**TEA**

**11.15 am – 11.30 am**

---

**SESSION 6**

**11.30 am – 1.30 pm**

***Roundtable on Culture of Governance and Conflict Resolution in India and Europe: Implications for Policy***

**Chairs:**

Partha S. Ghosh, Senior Fellow, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library)

Rajesh Tandon (PRIA)

**Presentations on Policy Briefs:**

Amit Prakash (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

- *Conflict, Governance and Development: Lessons from Bihar and Jharkhand*

Elena Stavrevska (Central European University)

- *Ensuring Political Representation in Bosnia-Herzegovina*

Sumona DasGupta (PRIA)

- *Panchayat Elections in Jammu and Kashmir: A Lost Opportunity for Conflict Sensitive Governance*

Nona Mekhelidze (Institute for International Affairs)

- *Opening the Russian-Georgian Railway Link through Abkhazia*

Priyanka Upadhyaya (Malviya Centre for Peace Research, BHU)

- *Interrogating Peace in Meghalaya*

**Lead Discussant:**

Partha S. Ghosh (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library)

---

---

Library)

**Responses and comments from policy-makers**

**Vote of thanks**

---

**LUNCH**

**1.30 pm – 2.30 pm**

---

## Annexure 2: Speaker Profiles\*

<b>Anuradha M. Chenoy</b>	Professor Anuradha M. Chenoy teaches in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
<b>B.G Verghese</b>	Columnist, author and Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, Delhi (since 1986), B.G. Verghese has worked on water resources, the Northeast, Kashmir, and South Asian regional cooperation. He has formerly been Editor, <i>Hindustan Times</i> (1969-75) and the <i>Indian Express</i> 1982-86. Mr Verghese was awarded the Magsaysay Award in 1975.
<b>Neera Chandhoke</b>	Neera Chandhoke has over four decades of teaching experience in comparative political theory, texts in political philosophy, history of political thought, state in developing countries, and politics of developing societies. Formerly at the Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, she is currently with the Indian Council of Social Science Research.
<b>Partha S. Ghosh</b>	Partha S. Ghosh is currently Senior Fellow, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Teen Murti House, New Delhi and Editor, <i>India Quarterly</i> , <i>Indian Council of World Affairs</i> . He was formerly Professor of South Asian Studies at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. His academic interests have included South Asian politics, migration, ethnicity, majority-minority relations, and domestic politics-foreign policy interface.
<b>Ummu Salma Bava</b>	Ummu Salma Bava is Director, Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Advanced Study (JNIAS), Jawaharlal Nehru University. She is also Director, Europe Area Studies Programme and Professor of European Studies at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Dr Bava's teaching and research experience include contemporary Indian, German and European foreign and security policy; regional integration and organization, emerging powers, international politics, globalization, global governance norms and conflict resolution.
<b>Tasneem Meenai</b>	Professor Tasneem Meenai is Dean, Students' Welfare, Jamia Millia Islamia and Officiating Director, Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

\*These are profiles of speakers who were not part of the project research teams.