



Cultures of Governance  
and Conflict Resolution  
in Europe and India



Funded under Socio-economic Sciences & Humanities



## D7.5 International Conference Europe

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## Notice

On 3 December 2013, CORE organized its final events in Brussels, being the dissemination seminar and the international conference.

This **international conference** served as an opportunity for the consortium to present the project and its overall results to a wider audience. Not only representatives from the European Institutions were invited by individual mails, also (non-) governmental agencies, representatives from civil society, Brussels-based think tanks, representatives from academia, policy makers and diplomatic corps of relevant countries were informed about this event and received invitations at several times. The networks of the consortium were used to spread the invitations on a personal level. Still, response and participation from EC representatives and other participants to this event was rather limited.

This deliverable includes the agenda, a summary of the presentations and the discussions, and a list of participants. It does not include a word-for-word reporting of all interventions, but summarizes the main interventions, reactions and directions of the discussions.

## **Report of the International Conference**

**3 December 2013  
Brussels, Belgium**

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## 1. Agenda

**FINAL CONFERENCE**  
**“CULTURES OF GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION**  
**IN EUROPE AND INDIA”**  
**Tuesday 3 December 2013**  
**Fondation Universitaire, 11 rue d’Egmont, 1000 Brussels**

13:30 – 13:40: “Cultures of Governance and Conflict Resolution” - Introduction to the concepts of the project; presented by Oliver P. Richmond (UNIMAN) and Ranabir Samaddar (MCRG)

**Session I: Comparing the EU’s and India’s approach to governance and conflict resolution**  
**Chaired by J. Peter Burgess (PRIO)**

13:40 – 14:10: “Learning from Governance Initiatives for Conflict Resolution: Local Agency, Inclusive Dialogue and Developmentality”  
Presented by Janel B. Galvanek (Berghof Foundation)

*This presentation will shed light on some lessons learned from several of the governance initiatives for conflict resolution under examination in the CORE project. In the first part we will attempt to measure the impact of four initiatives, focussing specifically on two aspects, namely the general lack of consideration of local agency and its potential capacity, and the lack of trustful, dialogical relations among conflict stakeholders. The second part of the presentation will have a look at the tendency of conflict resolution initiatives to be used by governance actors as a façade for pacification and the development of conflict areas. Initiatives are carried out – often in the field of economic development – without any consideration of the fact that these measures alone will not lead to a sustainable peace.*

Q&A

14:10 – 14:40: “Peacebuilding in Europe and India: Theory and Practice”  
Presented by Nathalie Tocci (IAI) and Priyanka Upadyaya (BHU)

*An analysis of the specific European and Indian interpretations of peacebuilding will be presented, including its objectives and policy instruments. The focus will then turn to the application of peacebuilding practices in a number of European – Cyprus, Bosnia and Georgia – and Indian – Bihar, Northeast and Kashmir – cases. Having examined these respective approaches to conflict resolution in theory and practice, the authors will conclude by delineating several avenues that the EU and India could consider in order to learn from one another’s experiences in conflict resolution.*

Q&A

14:40 – 15:10: “The Great Disconnect: Global governance and localised conflict in the cases of India and the EU”; Presented by Sandra Pogodda (UNIMAN)

*Academic scholarship displays a curious disconnect between two trends, connecting peace and governance issues. At the same time when conflicts tended to shift inwards (from inter-state to civil wars), global governance approaches seemed to decentre the management of peace and conflict outwards (from the nation state to international forums). This presentation investigates this disjuncture by examining the EU’s and India’s governance strategies in different conflict contexts. It studies whether their strategies operate close to the global governance model and/or whether they are able to connect with and effectively support local peace initiatives in conflict-ridden areas.*

Q&A

15:10 – 15:20: Discussion

15:20 – 15:30: Coffee

### **Session II: Distinct Indian and European experiences Chaired by Oliver Richmond (UNIMAN)**

15:30 – 16:00: “EU engagement with Civil Society Organisations in Conflict Ridden Countries: A Governance Perspective from Georgia, Cyprus and Bosnia and Herzegovina”; Presented by Kristoffer Lidén (PRIO), Elena Stavrevska (CEU) and Birte Vogel (UNIMAN)

*Support to civil society organisations (CSOs) plays a central role in the European Union’s (EU) development, neighbourhood and enlargement policies, not the least as an instrument of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. This presentation will analyse the character and effects of EU support of CSOs in the cases of Georgia, Cyprus and Bosnia and Herzegovina through the evaluation of four competing theoretical models.*

Q&A

16:00 – 16:30: “Implementation of Governance Initiatives in Conflict Settings in India”; Presented by Sumona DasGupta (PRIA), Rajesh Tandon (PRIA) and Amit Prakash (JNU)

*Conflicts in India, as elsewhere in the world, are present in different regions and locales. Some of these conflicts have been alive in some form or another since Indian independence in 1947 and have manifested violence with varying intensities either continuously or intermittently. In analyzing the responses to conflicts the framework of governance has been applied with the understanding that while any form of intervention can sometimes ameliorate, manage, or resolve conflicts, it can also fuel them further or generate new ones. Sometimes the processes occur simultaneously as every*

*governance intervention unleashes a set of intended and unintended consequences that impacts multiple actors at different levels.*

Q&A

16:30: Wrapping up of discussions - take aways of the day's debates.  
By Ranabir Samaddar (MCRG)

17:00 End of Conference

## **2. Report of Conference: Introductions, Discussions and Conclusions of the workshop**

### Last minute changes to the agenda:

Due to illness, J. Peter Burgess was replaced by Anjoo Sharan (BHU -Banaras Hindu University) to chair the first session.

### **2.1. “Cultures of Governance and Conflict Resolution” - Introduction to the concepts of the project; presented by Oliver P. Richmond (UNIMAN) and Ranabir Samaddar (MCRG)**

The concepts of the project were shortly presented by Ranabir Samaddar, who commented in brief how concepts get modified, enriched, and transformed through research, because the process of research is also a critique in operation. He also pointed out how the absences in the concepts are marked out through this process. The absence of certain realities in our understanding, which we realize through our research, acts in this way as an active present. He concluded by remarking that the post-colonial scenario of conflict, governance, and peace should not be seen as complete opposite to the European reality, or delinked from the evolving global governance model. The post-colonial scenario is marked however by its own contestations. Therefore in as much as we can say that a rigorous comparison between Europe and India cannot be made, a loose comparison of two experiences is gainful. The project by deploying the concepts creatively and skillfully has enriched our understanding. Europe will do good by learning from the specifics of the post-colonial experience.

### **2.2. Session I: Comparing the EU’s and India’s approach to governance and conflict resolution. Chaired by Anjoo Sharan (BHU)**

During this session, several member teams of the consortium presented their research done within the scope of the CORE project as well as the main research results with a comparative approach. This was based on the deliverables written for the project, extrapolating the results and presenting these towards a broader public.

**2.2.1. “Learning from Governance Initiatives for Conflict Resolution: Local Agency, Inclusive Dialogue and Developmentality”, Presented by Janel B. Galvanek (Berghof Foundation)**

Presentation based on D6.4 Report on regimes of global governance, Europe and India, written by Janel B. Galvanek and Samir Kumar Das.

The report carried out an impact analysis of four specific initiatives on their respective conflicts and peacebuilding processes. The focus was on dialogical relations between actors involved and the consideration of local agency in the design and implementation of initiatives. Many designers and implementers of initiatives simply assume that their efforts have contributed at least something to peace. But this may not always be the case. Without an honest examination combined with realistic reflection, no lessons learned can be drawn.

The first initiative examined was the Green Line Regulation in Cyprus. Critical local agency takes the form of active resistance to the Green Line Regulation, but this resistance is often dismissed as ‘spoiler’ activity and is not acknowledged as a legitimate political statement. This resistance is an example of local agency expressing itself in response to what many Greek Cypriots feel is an unsatisfactory initiative, as such trade is understood to implicitly recognise the government in the north. This renders ineffective much of the Green Line Regulation. In terms of impact, the assessment in general demonstrates that the GLR had a negligible impact on the peacebuilding process in Cyprus and may have even created more tension.

A more positive example in terms of dialogical relations is the relationship that many of the women’s organizations in Nagaland in Northeast India have with the central Indian government. Due to patriarchal context of Nagaland, much of what the women promote has been blocked by the traditional norms of Naga society. This has led to the women entering into a strategic alliance with the state, for instance in ensuring the political representation of women. The state recognized a partner in the women’s organisations, as they shared the same goal: a reduction in violence. Therefore, it took up many of the women’s concerns. This is thus a good example of the communication and interaction that is necessary to allow all parties to communicate their needs and to allow all actors to actively contribute to the shaping of projects and strategies for peacebuilding. The women’s organisations have been enormously effective in terms of empowering women to work for peace and justice. It is a fine example of participants being encouraged to develop and broaden their efforts for peace. Women’s organisations in Nagaland have also contributed to the reform of institutions that address the underlying grievances of a conflict and helped increase the accountability of the government.

The second section of the report had a closer look at the tendency of conflict resolution initiatives to be used by governance actors as a façade for pacification and the development of conflict areas. Over the last two decades, a change has taken place in the technology of governing conflicts in India. Before, state measures consisted predominantly of counter-insurgency campaigns, but in the 1990s the Indian State realized that counterinsurgency operations alone would not suffice. This led to a shift in the technology of governance. This developmentalism may not be meeting people’s expectations, but it has already created a new desire for development – developmentality. Now the agenda of rights, specifically in Northeast India, seems to have shifted from citizenship defined



in contradistinction with outsiders or foreigners, to a rather new citizenship defined as people's right to equality, equal opportunities, and rights over natural resources. But how development is institutionally delivered, rather than development per se, is found to be important in the governance of conflicts. Peace achieved through pacification (mainly by force) and peace based on some durable solution to conflicts, respecting the triadic principles of rights, justice and democracy, are certainly not the same. Peace based on consensus by way of involving various sectors of society is found to be more durable than peace without it.

**2.2.2. “Peacebuilding in Europe and India: Theory and Practice”, Presented by Nathalie Tocci (IAI) and Priyanka Upadhyaya (BHU)**

This presentation is based on D6.5: Comparative report on empirical basis for global governance, Europe and India.

Drawing together the threads of European and Indian approaches to peacebuilding through governance, what can be learnt? What are the similarities and the differences in the two's peacebuilding goals and means and the manner in which these have been deployed in practice?

Before engaging in such comparative analysis a caveat is of order. Conflicts persist within the European Union. While active violence in areas such as Cyprus, Northern Ireland or the Basque Country has subsided, the conflict transformation process is still underway, and, in cases such as Cyprus, it has not even yielded a settlement between the principal parties. Notwithstanding, the EU has taken a backseat on conflicts within its borders. With the partial exception of Cyprus, whose straddling across EU boundaries (Greek/Greek Cypriot – Turkish/Turkish Cypriot) has led to a degree of involvement by EU institutions, on other “internal” conflicts, the EU has been passive. The principle of not meddling in the national security affairs of its member states has prevailed. By contrast, the EU has been fairly active in conflict areas within the remit of the enlargement and neighbourhood policy. Drawing upon the assets of its sui generis supranational/intergovernmental nature, the EU has projected its governance initiatives beyond its borders, attempting to induce conflict resolution. In the case of India, this has not been the case. While Indian foreign policy in principle seeks to promote peace beyond its borders, in practice the bulk of Indian peacebuilding efforts has been exerted within Indian boundaries. The Indian state has increasingly devoted itself to peacebuilding in areas such as Afghanistan or Sri Lanka, but its efforts have been incomparably deeper and more long-lasting on Indian soil. As a state, albeit federal, and thus lacking the external governance dimension that a sui generis actor such as the EU may have, India's “peace as governance” has been conceptualized and implemented largely within India itself.

Caveats aside, two striking similarities emerge from the analysis, both related to the peacebuilding goals pursued by the EU and India. First, both the EU and India favour constitutional and institutional governance measures that discourage secession, while seeking to accommodate diversity through federalism, autonomy and decentralization. In India, after the initial openness displayed by Gandhi and Nehru towards a plebiscite in Kashmir, ensuing administrations hardened their stance. Likewise, with few exceptions – Kosovo – the EU has generally rejected secession. Specifically, it has done so in Georgia, Bosnia and Cyprus. While shunning secession, the EU has

openly embraced federal solutions or proposals to conflicts along its borders. The EU's support for the Dayton constitutional architecture in Bosnia or the Annan Plan in Cyprus are testimony to this fact. India too has been firmly committed to negotiate peace within its Constitutional provisions, pursuing autonomy based solutions as the constitutional panacea for peacebuilding. The three-tier Panchayati Raj Institutions, the autonomous councils established in the Northeast or the Autonomy Hill Council established in Ladakh highlight India's instinctive embrace of decentralization as a means to cater for the demands for internal self-determination.

A second meeting of minds between the EU and India regards the promotion of law and order. Within the realm of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, initiatives aimed at border monitoring and security sector and judicial reform have been prominent, with civilian missions such as EUJUST-Themis or EUMM in Georgia being two examples. Likewise in India, peacebuilding through rule of law promotion has been key. Notable in this respect is the case of Bihar, where the Janata Dal Unite government instituted a Chief Minister in the Court of People, a government at the doorstep of the citizen for on-spot grievance redressal, and a zero-tolerance policy towards caste-based violence. The slant in India's peace efforts in this respect has been more towards the promotion of social justice as opposed to the EU's initiatives being more "neutrally" tailored to rule of law promotion.

Beyond these similarities lie several important differences regarding mainly the means employed in peacebuilding. First, India's coercive approach to conflicts has invested the direct use of security/military instruments. Through extraordinary legislation such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, the Public Safety Act and counterinsurgency operations the Indian state has coercively suppressed violent rebellion. EU coercion has generally not taken the direct military route, not least in view of the absence of an effective EU military instrument and of the internal consensus to utilize it. Coercive EU policies have taken "softer" forms: policies of conditionality in which the EU has influenced the cost-benefit analysis of conflict actors through the conditional promise of carrots or the waging of (mainly economic) sticks. This has been particularly striking in the case of EU policies towards the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey as regards the Cyprus conflict, albeit not delivering the intended results.

Second, when engaging in bottom-up peacebuilding efforts, the EU has put prime emphasis on civil society. Civil society, and most notably NGO engagement, has become a principal leg of EU peacebuilding policies. In the case of Georgia and Abkhazia, engagement with local civil society through initiatives such as COBERM have been amongst the most successful means for the EU both to engage directly actors from the non-recognized Abkhaz de facto state, as well as to induce regular contact between the civil societies from the two sides. Shunning official contact with secessionist state officials, the EU has viewed the civil society channel as a means to influence non-recognized entities. In India instead, bottom-up initiatives have tended to prioritize direct dialogue with insurgent groups. On most occasions, the government has insisted that armed groups surrender their arms before any negotiation is held. But it has also made exceptions, such as the negotiation with Naga insurgents. The ongoing peace talks between the Government of India with insurgent groups like NSCN (I-M) and ULFA is a case in point, alongside the agreements reached with various Northeast ethnic groups such as the 1985 Assam accord or the 1986 Mizoram accord.

Finally, at mid-level, the EU has engaged in functional cooperation which has broadly pursued a

developmental-technical agenda. In Bosnia, for instance, the EU has engaged in wide-ranging capacity building efforts aimed at bringing the Bosnian legal and institutional framework closer to EU standards, as well as train Bosnian officials in a variety of soft skills, from communication to management and administration. In India instead, the developmental effort has been more explicitly political. For the Northeast, a Ministry of Development of the North Eastern Region has been established to advocate the special needs of the region to other Ministries/Departments. In Bihar, the Panchayat Institutions have reserved quotas for women, extreme backward and secluded castes, contributing to a significant improvement in human development standards.

On the whole, neither the EU nor India have a spotless record in peacebuilding through governance. The Indian democracy's record in handling internal conflicts is rather mixed. Some conflicts were resolved and managed, but some reemerged. The untamed challenge of Naxalite violence for one diminishes the Indian governance's quest to bring about sustainable peace with development. The deficit of governance, especially at local level, provides a ready-made context to undermine the peaceful avenues of Indian democracy. It is hard to convince suffering tribal people that real power flows from the ballot box and not from the bullets (Priyankar. 2007). In Europe too, unbalanced policies of conditionality, selectively narrow engagement with civil society and an over technical approach to development have marked clear limits to the conflict transformation potential of its peacebuilding initiatives.

Yet in both cases, there are important successes too, as well as lessons to be learnt from one another. Indian democratic governance that reflects indigenous values has been relatively successful in handling upheavals and conflicts peacefully. It has evolved and improvised many conflict mitigating remedies around the norms of power sharing and inclusion, notwithstanding downsides and deficiencies in their implementation. Likewise, the European Union, being based upon the quest of cementing peace on the European continent, has attempted to export its governance models beyond its borders, seeking to reconcile conflict groups in the broader European space and beyond.

Much could be learnt from one another: India's greater social-political slant to development could complement the EU's technical approach, while its openness to engage directly insurgent groups could be heeded by the EU, which is still reluctant to engage directly with non-state actors for the fear of conferring upon them legal recognition. On the other side, the EU's engagement with civil society could complement India's approach to local governance, while its policies of conditionality could represent a softer means of inducing (or coercing) change than blunt military instruments. This process of mutual exchange and learning would call for a deep and institutionalized dialogue between the two sides, which could constitute a welcome addition to the agenda of the EU-India Strategic partnership, on which peacebuilding has been woefully absent to date.

### **2.2.3. *“The Great Disconnect: Global governance and localised conflict in the cases of India and the EU”, Presented by Sandra Pogodda (UNIMAN)***

This presentation is based on D6.6: Scholarly article on re-conceptualizing global governance based on new findings, written by Sandra Pogodda, Oliver P. Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty, University of Manchester

Academic scholarship displays a curious disconnect between two trends, connecting peace and governance issues. At the same time when conflicts tended to shift inwards (from inter-state to civil wars), global governance approaches seemed to decentre the management of peace and conflict outwards (from the nation state to international forums). This presentation investigates this disjuncture by examining the EU’s and India’s governance strategies in different conflict contexts. It studies whether their strategies operate close to the global governance model and/or whether they are able to connect with and effectively support local peace initiatives in conflict-ridden areas.

As a starting point, one could expect a different engagement with global governance from India (as one of its early subjects) compared to the EU (as a product of global governance itself). Since India has no fallback option, its primary objective to secure its sovereignty and territorial integrity requires a social contract closely allied to its population through devolution. The EU’s governance frameworks, by contrast, has been set up to follow liberal global governance more closely and expound ‘normative power’. Our findings indicate, however, that this clear contrast does not prevail in both actors’ peacebuilding practices. In so far as global governance aims to rescue the nation state from its diminishing relevance in international affairs (in particular by anchoring polities with a body of law that safeguards human rights and democracy) both entities seem to pursue its policies. In development policy, however, where global governance reduces the role of the state, neither the EU nor India follow the global governance blueprint. In terms of statebuilding, both the EU and India try to go beyond the security bias of global governance approaches and to introduce policies that improve state-society relations, with various degrees of effort and success.

However, neither produces a purely liberal framework of governance, nor a purely localised framework. They follow to some extent contextual patterns, implying a hybrid approach that caters to both: local needs and international norms. The former provides the possibility of a contextual peace, while the latter ensures international support. And yet, the quality of peace that both entities produce in their different contexts is uneven and varied.

Through their analysis, the authors have shown that a co-dependent relationship exists between grassroots peace projects and state-led attempts to promote peace. The more successful examples, however, are those where Indian or EU support followed the lead of civil society initiatives, rather than trying to steer or redirect them through their own agendas. Here, both entities acted in the interest of stability, rather than used civil society to gain domestic legitimacy in pursuit of their own interests.

Whether global governance at large would be able to reverse its state-rescue mission allied somewhat contradictorily to global capital, human rights, and democracy, and turn inwards to

embrace the needs and politics of peace communities and local peace projects, however, remains to be seen. In this paper we tried to show that both, the normatively and structurally pre-determined interventions of national or international actors as well as the context-sensitive peace projects that emerge at the grassroots have their limitations with regard to conflict resolution.

What does this mean for any attempt to learn about the consequences of global governance, intended or otherwise, or its reconceptualisation? The adherence to the liberal peace framework at the international, regional and state level, as well as the appeal of human rights, democracy and development, and the rolling back of the state's security apparatus to some degree at least, indicates that global governance has had fairly similar impacts in both contexts. At the same time, the proliferation of local organisations, peace agencies, advocacy movements, and attempts to redistribute material resources by the state rather than by the international community suggests that there is a major gap between its aspirations and the needs and expectations of local populations. Our comparison suggests that global governance offers the prospect of a limited peace that is supported by many elites and local actors. Grassroots peace movements, by contrast, tend to exercise agency to fill the major fissures and improve the quality of peace. In some cases this suggests a major reform of global governance might be necessary where local movements, the state and international actors remain at loggerheads, as in BiH for example. In our European cases, global governance positions the local and the state as needing to reform along the lines of the liberal peace rather than closing the gap by incorporating a more heterogeneous form of peace (ie a hybrid peace). In India, the state has realised its dependence on local peace agency for mediation between local insurgents and was in turn willing to accommodate local demands. Hence, the Indian state and society are evolving in a co-dependent manner but again somewhat divorced from the global governance model, which has often been seen as undermining important aspects of the social contract. To reconceptualise global governance in terms of effective conflict resolution across these cases implies that the gap between global governance and the post-conflict or constituent state needs to be closed, and this may mean a significant reformulation of its political, economic, and social preferences.

## **2.3. Session II: Distinct Indian and European experiences, Chaired by Oliver Richmond (UNIMAN)**

### **2.3.1. “EU engagement with Civil Society Organisations in Conflict Ridden Countries: A Governance Perspective from Georgia, Cyprus and Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Presented by Kristoffer Lidén (PRIO), Elena B. Stavrevska (CEU) and Birte Vogel (UNIMAN)**

This presentation and report is based on D6.3, scholarly article on the European governance agenda: “EU Engagement with Civil Society Organisations in Conflict-Ridden Countries: A Governance Perspective from Georgia, Cyprus and Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

From a peacebuilding perspective, EU support for civil society organisations (CSOs) in conflict-ridden countries can be criticised for artificially boosting a liberal, ‘bourgeois’ civil society at the expense of more representative, established and effective organisations at the grassroots. Seen from a governance perspective, however, this criticism conceals the actual rationale and effects of these practices by underplaying the way in which EU investments in ‘local ownership and participation’ are affected by general foreign policy objectives.

As a basis for a more relevant and realistic debate on sub-national dimensions of peacebuilding, this paper therefore investigates what the character and effects of EU ‘peacebuilding’ support for CSOs in conflict-ridden countries actually are: How does it affect the relations between the supported organisations and (1) the state; (2) other societal groups; and (3) the EU? How ought these effects to be interpreted in political terms? In this presentation we concentrate on the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Cyprus, while relating these to the case of Georgia in the conclusion.

#### Civil society organisations (CSO) and EU engagement

CSOs are generally perceived by local populations to be donor-driven. Other issues such as nepotism, where the CSO employees are family members of the executives, have strengthened the negative image of CSOs locally. This obviously affects their legitimacy in the local societies in a negative way. Still, the EU’s support for CSOs in conflict areas aims to assist the process of democracy development, and encourages the third sector to participate in governance processes. The EU has over many years now financed projects designed for improving the living conditions of conflict-affected people. This has often been done through supporting local civil society organisations.

Four perspectives on the political character of this support can be derived from recent literature on international ‘liberal’ peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts of which EU CSO support is an integral component: (1) *liberal peace*—liberal peacebuilding strengthens democracy and a self-sustainable peace, (2) *hollow hegemony*—liberal peacebuilding undermines a locally rooted democratisation effort and creates an unsustainable peace reliant on foreign presence and support, (3) *vibrant hegemony*—liberal peacebuilding is not primarily about peace or democracy

promotion, but strategic self-serving alliances between local and international actors, and (4) *post-liberal peace*—liberal peacebuilding fails to build a liberal peace, but changes the political dynamics in the target countries in ways that allow for more locally rooted peace formation.

The following assumptions on the impact of EU CSO support can be derived from these four perspectives:

	<b>Liberal Peace</b>	<b>Hollow Hegemony</b>	<b>Vibrant Hegemony</b>	<b>Post-Liberal Peace</b>
<b>Society</b>	Liberal elements in the society are strengthened to the benefit of the wider society. Domestic peace is built.	CSOs and their beneficiaries are temporarily strengthened at the expense of wider society.	Domestic political divisions are reinforced and a peace based on foreign support sustained.	An artificial civil society sector is created, but assistance is manipulated to the benefit of the wider society.
<b>State</b>	Liberal elements in the state are strengthened at the expense of illiberal elements, strengthening domestic peace.	The state is weakened at the expense of unaccountable and dependent CSOs.	The state apparatus is transformed, made reliant on services of foreign supported CSOs.	The state is weakened, opening space for non-state initiatives beyond EU supported CSOs.
<b>EU</b>	The position of the EU in the recipient country is strengthened, strengthening international peace.	The position of the EU is strengthened relative to non-interference, but on unsustainable basis.	The EU gains control, reinforcing an a-liberal ‘transnational peace’ of mutual benefit to the EU and the recipient.	The EU fails to control political developments, but a more rooted peace of interest to the EU is still engendered.

Table 1: Ideal typical assumptions on the impact of EU CSO support on society, state and the EU

### The Bosnian case

The EU has tried to promote the involvement of CSOs in the development of the legal and institutional framework. This, however, has had no tangible results and it can even be argued that the EU has failed to empower grassroots initiatives.

Since the end of the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has received significant amounts of foreign aid. A large part of it has been aimed towards development of a liberal democratic order and development of a civil society. The civil society sector has been expected to complement the state in providing services, but also in being the main driver of the recreation of the social fabric and reconciliation. This, however, has not materialised. Instead of becoming the voice of the citizens and the one overseeing the work of the governing structures, the civil society is seen by the

majority of the citizens as a profit-making industry and by the state officials as a potential ally, whose involvement would legitimise certain initiatives.

In recent years not only has international funding of the civil society in BiH been reduced, but also whatever is still available is poorly coordinated from the donors' side. The EU remains the single largest donor in this domain. Nonetheless, the funding requirements of the donors, along with the mental matrix of most of the civil society actors to develop initiatives based on the donors' funding priorities, rather than the population's most immediate needs, have reduced the civil society to organisations that are by and far donor-driven.

### The Cyprus case

In Cyprus, the UNDP is clearly the most influential civil society donor and it is very much involved in all peacebuilding initiatives. International actors have gradually pulled out of a general CSO support to exclusively fund peace-orientated civil society that is in favour of their solution to the Cyprus problem.

It is often hard to distinguish between EU and UNDP projects. Often the UNDP has the lead and the EU is the junior partner. The development of civil society driven by the EU is rather dominated by legal and right-based approaches, which relates to the preparation of Northern Cyprus implementing the *acquis* and integration of the two sides of the island through trade. Due to the complex and difficult political situation on the ground, the EU engages differently with civil society in the Turkish and Greek Cypriot entities. The approach in the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus can be best categorised as liberal peace. Support for civil society organisations in the North is rather characterised by elements of statebuilding. The preparation for the implementation of the *acquis* is just one example

Part of the civil society in Cyprus has its roots in bi-communal activism, which has achieved something impressive regarding the ethno-nationalist and repressive condition it had to operate in. The space is still there, but it has been partly co-opted by internationals and tends to be marginalised by state elites. At the same time, rather than providing core funding to CSOs and leave the decision about the best possible use of these funds with the local activists, donors provide project funding. This impacts on the long-term stability of CSOs as they can hardly plan ahead of the next project.

### Conclusions

Having compared the cases of BiH, Cyprus and Georgia, the paper sheds light on the objectives of EU CSO support being in accordance with the liberal peace perspective, but the effects involving various combinations of the assumptions derived from the other three perspectives. Concerning the impact on the relationship between the supported CSOs and the states in which they operate, the 'post-liberal' perspective may nonetheless be most accurate in describing how new political dynamics are created through the support, dynamics that are neither reducible to foreign objectives, nor local initiatives.

In Georgia, the institution-building with EU's assistance came with serious shortcomings in the domains of the rule of law, freedom of media, and the respect of private property, with an ensuing



sense of injustice and frustration among the population. All this had negative effects on the peace process. Due to the serious democratic shortcomings in Georgia, the Abkhaz did not consider Georgia as a state worth reintegrating into and where their rights would be respected. What we have from the EU's side towards the above-described statebuilding process in Georgia is the 'accommodation of local cultures of governance'. In Cyprus, the state keeps marginalising peace-orientated civil society as a possible threat to the agendas of the national ethno-nationalist elites. Pro-reunification CSOs partly challenge the way the current Cypriot state is constituted and therefore it tries either to ignore or actively delegitimise those initiatives. The support by the EU can only partially help to overcome the isolation of inter-communal pro-peace actors. While the EU can confer some legitimacy on selected actors, it simultaneously sidelines, co-opts and selects CSOs as a tool to implement liberal peacebuilding. And in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU CSO support is mainly co-opted and there is little to no real resistance from the CSOs, which in turn does not change the dynamics in terms of the already established hegemonies of power and existing political orders. The lack of resistance comes primarily as a result of the EU being the biggest donor in this domain and the CSOs being donor-dependent, as explained above.

With regard to the relationship between the supported CSOs and other societal actors, these dynamics were accounted for in the comparison above. Here, the three cases demonstrate a variation between the relevance of the three perspectives from case to case. In Georgia, the strengthening of EU friendly CSOs versus other social and political actors resonates the most with the vibrant hegemony model. In Cyprus, the most accurate perspective might be in-between the liberal peace and hollow hegemony perspective. While accountability for CSO initiatives has long been shifted to the EU level and the other external donors, the basic idea behind the support remains in the sphere of the liberal peace approach. And in BiH, both the hollow and the vibrant hegemony perspectives find applicability. Namely, even though the EU has tried to shy away from it in recent years, the accountability has long been shifted from the local, domestic, to the international scene, as described in the hollow hegemony perspective. At the same time, however, there is no real distinction in terms of genuineness between the CSOs that are foreign-funded and grassroots initiatives that are not, which corresponds to one of the vibrant hegemony assumptions.

The three cases thereby demonstrate that there is a need for further research on the determinants of this variation and that rather than sweeping statements on hegemony or resistance, a more comprehensive and nuanced account of the political character and effects of EU CSO support is needed.

### **2.3.2. “Implementation of Governance Initiatives in Conflict Settings in India”, Presented by Sumona DasGupta (PRIA), Rajesh Tandon (PRIA) and Amit Prakash (JNU)**

This presentation is based on D6.2: Scholarly article on the Indian Governance Agenda: “Implementation of governance initiatives in conflict settings in India”

Conflicts in India, as elsewhere in the world, are present in different regions and locales. Some of these conflicts have been alive in some form or another since Indian independence in 1947 and have manifested violence with varying intensities either continuously or intermittently. Post colonial India’s democratic state has attempted to deal with these conflicts in several ways, with different types of outcomes. In analyzing the responses to conflicts the framework of governance has been applied with the understanding that while any form of intervention can sometimes ameliorate, manage, or resolve conflicts, it can also fuel them further or generate new ones. Sometimes the processes occur simultaneously as every governance intervention unleashes a set of intended and unintended consequences that impacts multiple actors at different levels.

The relationship between governance and conflict in the Indian context can be seen to be two-way. An intervention can change the context and the dynamics of the conflict or impact the drivers of the conflict. At the same time the changing trajectory of the conflict can itself limit or alter the nature of intervention whether by government, the market or other societal actors acting on their own or in some combination thereof.

India’s restive borderlands along the Northeast, the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir bordering Pakistan, as well as the central Indian states of Jharkhand and Bihar have all been sites of violent conflict at different times following independence in 1947. The contexts are of course very different.

This presentation started out by clarifying how we use the term governance given the changing discourses and explosion of literature on this subject and move on to exploring the implementation of governing measures in addressing endemic militarized conflicts in India. We identify and analyze four important thematic rubrics, around which, we submit, governance and instruments of governmentality coalesce in these conflict spots - namely, electoral democracy, security, ‘developmentalism’ and peace accords. We discuss the governance measures in each of these thematic clusters in terms of their viability, accountability, legitimacy and efficiency and in that context reflect on the nature of sustainable peacebuilding in India.

The presentation was concluded with the following remarks:

The narratives from India’s conflict zones indicate two things. First we see that governance particularly in conflict areas is always in a state of flux as new rules of engagement emerge through the various combinations of private and public authority and the emergence of markets sometimes in collusion with the Indian state as a major player in these conflicts. The continuously shifting interests of non state economic and political actors in the central, state, regional and local levels with new elites being created due to the conflict and the range of responses of social actors on the ground help create a complex power mosaic. It follows therefore that governance in conflict areas is always a political task and it generates a continuous political expansion that happens at every

level and every stage.

During the past decade the meaning of governance has been considerably altered in the imagination of ordinary citizens. Popular participation in decision making about issues that affect the lives of the people has become a constant demand. Therefore the discourse in India as well as its practice has begun to influence the state to reform itself. The Right to information Act is one example of ensuring transparency in the way the government functions. The modern information technology is being used to share more information about the norms, criteria and process of decision making that governments at all tiers adopt. Likewise the accountability of government officials for non performance of their duties is being fixed in several legislative provisions like NREGA, service charters etc.

In some fundamental ways therefore the business of governance of society is no longer exclusively in the hands of national governments alone. The provincial governments, PRIs and municipalities are all mandated to govern the affairs of India today. In this process of transition effective division of labour across different jurisdictions is yet to stabilize. Contestations about devolution of authority and resources are continuing.

Therefore what India's discourse on governance suggests particularly in conflict spots are two contending sometimes colliding forces at work. Despite the top down governance measures that are put in place and the visible hand of the central government much more participatory processes and forms are also simultaneously being invented through actual practices on the ground. As citizens become more assertive and vocal as civil society becomes more involved and as media, despite allegations that it acts irresponsibly and is guided more by the market than by journalistic ethics, continues its overall watchdog role, the meaning of governance in India is gradually becoming more inclusive bottom up and with this also more contested. Notwithstanding the central government's attempt to keep the conflicts "under control" it is no longer a simple public administration approach or the colonial law and order machinery that will be equated with emerging meanings of participatory and democratic governance in India today. Viewed in this sense governance in India is about state-society relations. Participatory governance conceptions include the administrative and public management instruments and institutions but are not limited to them.

Understanding governance in conflict spots in India today entails understanding how bottom up processes of popular participation interact with the formal institutions of governance in Indian democracy. This interaction brings into the discourse what Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2011) have described as a state-nation framework. The Westphalian nation-state frame makes the state the centre around which different communities, sub cultures and ethnic nationalities define themselves. In the state-nation frame that state has to accommodate multiple nationalities communities and subcultures as well as their diverse aspirations. This perspective reinforces the principle of subsidiarity in governance arrangements and requires much more authentic and sensitive devolution to sub regional and regional institutions of governance, not as a pacification strategy, but to create a peace based on what Das (2012) has called "the triadic principles of rights, justice and democracy." A quiescent state-managed suspension of violence based on pacification cannot be the basis of sustainable social peace.

## **2.4 Wrapping up of discussions - take aways of the day's debates. By Ranabir Samaddar (MCRG)**

Ranabir Samaddar (MCRG) concluded the conference with the following remarks:

He underlined that a loose comparison between India and the EU makes sense, even if it is not an obvious exercise. It helps bringing our research to the next level. This comparison does not necessarily need to be in a structuralist-functionalist sense, as a sense of converging and diverging historical trajectories remains important and an absolute necessity. He added that the project results assisted in bringing a clearer idea of a global governance model and the particularity of post-colonial experiences into existence, which Europe should absolutely take note of. Even in posing as a normative power, Europe has to look for differing conditions that make certain norms contingent and contentious.

Ranabir Samaddar confirms that the research done in the frame of the CORE project has produced a variety of results and modes of inquiry. The lesson learned is in terms of developing a platform style of research.

## Annex I: List of participants

<i>Basu Ray Chaudhury(excused)</i>	<i>Sabyasachi</i>	<i>MCRG</i>
<i>Burgess (excused)</i>	<i>J. Peter</i>	<i>PRIO</i>
Cameron	Fraser	EU-Asia Centre
<i>DasGupta</i>	<i>Sumona</i>	<i>PRIA</i>
Eberlen	Mathias	European Parliament
Fanari	Eleonora	European Institute of Asian Studies (EIAS)
<i>Fernandez</i>	<i>Maria Castillo</i>	<i>EEAS</i>
<i>Galvanek</i>	<i>Janel B.</i>	<i>Berghof Foundation</i>
<i>Giessman</i>	<i>Hans-Joachim</i>	<i>Berghof Foundation</i>
Hatzigeorgopoulos	Myrto	ISIS Europe
Karammel	Susy	Arcor
Koops	Joachim	VUB, Global Governance Institute (GGI)
<i>Liberatore</i>	<i>Angela</i>	<i>EC DG Research</i>
<i>Lidén</i>	<i>Kristoffer</i>	<i>PRIO</i>
Liebl	Josephine	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
Loose	Olivier	Global Network for Change
Martin de Almagro	Maria	ULB
Manharsinh	Yadav	Indian Embassy (+ colleague)
<i>Mikhelidze (excused)</i>	<i>Nona</i>	<i>IAI</i>
Mørkved Aavatsmark	Paal Ivar	Mission of Norway to the EU
Pascual	Alfonso	EEAS
<i>Pagodda</i>	<i>Sandra</i>	<i>UNIMAN</i>
<i>Prakash</i>	<i>Amit</i>	<i>JNU</i>
Pritti	Rana	EIAS
<i>Richmond</i>	<i>Oliver P.</i>	<i>UNIMAN</i>
<i>Samaddar</i>	<i>Ranabir</i>	<i>MCRG</i>
<i>Sharan</i>	<i>Anjoo</i>	<i>BHU</i>
<i>Stavrevska</i>	<i>Elena B.</i>	<i>CEU</i>
<i>Tocci</i>	<i>Nathalie</i>	<i>IAI</i>
<i>Upadhyaya</i>	<i>Priyankar</i>	<i>BHU</i>
Visoka	Gizem	Dublin City University
<i>Vogel</i>	<i>Birte</i>	<i>UNIMAN</i>